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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS: NOT MUCH HOPE 





 & Martin A. Schwartz
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: RECENT TRENDS IN THE QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
This Article highlights important developments in the quali-
fied immunity defense to Section 1983 claims.  The focus is on recent 
Supreme Court decisions and the fallout from such decisions in the 
lower courts.  First, however, we tackle the Supreme Court’s recent 
expansion of absolute immunity to grand jury witnesses, and its im-
pact on the application of qualified immunity.  Second, consideration 
is given to the Court’s newfound willingness to provide qualified 
immunity to private actors engaged in conduct under color of state 
law.  Third, this Article discusses the continued effects of the Su-
preme Court’s reformulation of the qualified immunity analysis that 
allows lower courts to skip deciding the merits of the constitutional 
issue and jump to the question of whether the law was clearly estab-
lished.  Finally, this Article discusses recent decisions making it more 
difficult for Section 1983 plaintiffs to establish that the federal law 
was clearly established.  
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Law Journal. 
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A.  The Line Between Absolute and Qualified 
Immunity Since Rehberg 
PROFESSOR BLUM: A discussion about significant devel-
opments in the landscape of qualified immunity would not be com-
plete without a few words about the Supreme Court’s most recent 
case on absolute immunity and the impact that case might have on the 
line drawn between absolute and qualified immunity in certain cir-
cumstances.  This past Term, in Rehberg v. Paulk,1 the Supreme 
Court clarified that the absolute immunity traditionally afforded to 
trial witnesses2 extends to grand jury witnesses as well.3  Paulk was a 
chief investigator in a local district attorney’s office.4  His testimony 
before a grand jury on three different occasions was instrumental in 
bringing about three different indictments against Mr. Rehberg, each 
of which was ultimately dismissed.5  The Court rejected the argument 
that Paulk should be treated as a “complaining witness,” and thus en-
titled to only qualified immunity.6  Noting that “testifying, whether 
before a grand jury or at trial, was not the distinctive function per-
formed by a complaining witness,”7 the Court concluded that a law 
enforcement officer who testifies before a grand jury is performing a 
function quite different from the function of applying for an arrest 
warrant or the decision to initiate a prosecution.8  In holding that ab-
solute immunity would protect grand jury witnesses from Section 
1983 claims based on their grand jury testimony, the Court also 
warned that “this rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a 
Grand Jury witness conspired to present false testimony, or by using 
evidence of the witness’s testimony to support any other § 1983 
claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution.”9  
 
1 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012). 
2 See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983) (holding that police officers are 
entitled to absolute immunity for claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 arising out of al-
legedly perjured testimony at criminal trials). 
3 Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1505. (“The factors that justify absolute immunity for trial wit-
nesses apply with equal force to grand jury witnesses.”). 
4 Id. at 1500. 
5 Id. at 1501. 
6 Id. at 1507 n.1 (distinguishing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-131 (1997), and 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-345 (1986), where only qualified immunity was provid-
ed to law enforcement officers for the filing of false affidavits). 
7 Id. at 1507. 
8 Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1507-08. 
9 Id. at 1506. 
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Although this language provides for a very expansive protection for 
all claims based on grand jury witness testimony,10 two post-Rehberg 
cases suggest windows that may be carved out for plaintiffs to pursue 
Section 1983 claims, even in cases where grand jury testimony or 
grand jury witnesses might be implicated.11 
In Sankar v. City of New York,12 a district court in New York 
noted that “Rehberg did not alter controlling Second Circuit (and 
New York) law that an officer’s filing of a sworn complaint is suffi-
cient to satisfy the initiation prong of a malicious prosecution 
claim.”13  Thus, according to the court, the fact that the officer in this 
case eventually provided grand jury testimony was not an “all-
purpose shield from malicious prosecution.”14  The court stated that 
in the event false testimony is provided during the filing of the affi-
davit, the swearing of the complaint, or the filing of the sworn com-
plaint, an officer is entitled only to the protection of qualified immun-
ity—even if the officer ultimately testifies at a grand jury 
proceeding.15  Therefore, despite Rehberg’s language, which estab-
lishes absolute immunity from claims based on a conspiracy to pro-
vide false testimony,16 law enforcement officials should still be enti-
tled to only qualified immunity for conduct performed as a 
complaining witness prior to the giving of grand jury testimony.17 
A second case, Frederick v. New York City,18 from the South-
ern District of New York, involved a motion to unseal selected por-
 
10 See, e.g., Jones v. Dalton, 867 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (D.N.J. 2012) (stating absolute im-
munity prohibited plaintiff from rebutting presumption of probable cause with evidence that 
investigator made misrepresentations to grand jury). 
11 See, e.g., Sankar v. City of New York, No. 07 CV 4726(RJD)(SMG), 2012 WL 
2923236, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (granting only qualified immunity on malicious 
prosecution claim for police officer who filed the initial sworn complaint and who also sub-
sequently testified at grand jury); see also Frederick v. New York City, No. 11 Civ. 
469(JPO), 2012 WL 4947806, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2012) (suggesting grand jury tes-
timony could be used to support a malicious prosecution claim against someone other than 
the person who provided the grand jury testimony). 
12 No. 07 CV 4726(RJD)(SMG), 2012 WL 2923236 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). 
13 Id. at *3. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  The grand jury testimony was inadmissible in that case; additionally, if the officer 
did, in fact, do something prior to the grand jury to warrant a malicious prosecution claim, 
the filing of the sworn complaint remains a basis for a malicious prosecution claim.  Id. 
16 Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506 (“This rule may not be circumvented by claiming that a 
Grand Jury witness conspired to present false testimony . . . .”). 
17 Sankar, 2012 WL 2923236, at *3. 
18 No. 11 Civ. 469(JPO), 2012 WL 4947806 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2012). 
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tions of an eyewitness’ grand jury testimony to support a malicious 
prosecution claim against the arresting officers, not the witness.19  In 
Frederick, after the witness of a drive by shooting told the police he 
could not identify the shooter or driver and failed to identify anyone 
in a photo array, the police brought the witness to a lineup where he 
identified a man as the shooter.20  The man was arrested under the 
theory that he was a driver, not a shooter; however, all charges were 
dropped three days later.21 
Here, the court drew an important distinction between the pro-
tection for a defendant’s grand jury testimony and the grand jury tes-
timony of a different witness.22  The court stated that it would exam-
ine the testimony in camera to decide whether to unseal it, but if the 
testimony was unsealed, it could only be used against the defendant 
police officers in the malicious prosecution claim, not against the 
grand jury witness.23  Thus, under Frederick, Rehberg does not pre-
clude the use of grand jury testimony to support all Section 1983 
claims, such as those against a police officer for malicious prosecu-
tion; Rehberg’s language that suggests grand jury testimony cannot 
be used to support a Section 1983 claim merely prohibits the use of 
such testimony against the witness who gave the testimony.24 
The discussion of absolute immunity would not be complete 
without mentioning a third case involving prosecutorial immunity.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Giraldo v. Kessler25 reflects a trend 
towards expanding the scope of absolute immunity to protect conduct 
associated not only with the prosecutorial function, but conduct typi-
cally viewed as investigative.  In Giraldo, a New York state senator, 
Hiram Monserrate, went to an emergency room with a female com-
panion, Karla Giraldo, because of a cut on Giarldo’s eye.26  Despite 
Monserrate’s claim that such injuries resulted from a glass acci-
dentally breaking, domestic violence was suspected, and he was ar-
rested.27  Giraldo supported Monserrate’s story and stated that she did 
 
19 Id. at *1, *2. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at *4. 
23 Frederick, 2012 WL 4947806, at *14. 
24 Id. at *3, *4. 
25 694 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2012). 
26 Id. at 164. 
27 Id. 
4
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not want to talk to the police.28  However, despite her unwillingness, 
the police continued to question her at the hospital, brought her to a 
police precinct to have her sign a statement, and brought her, against 
her will, to the District Attorney’s office for two more hours of inter-
rogation.29 
In response, Giraldo filed a claim against the assistant district 
attorneys who interrogated her, alleging that she was “ ‘unlawfully 
detained, held against her will and maliciously interrogated’ . . . in 
violation of her right to be free from unreasonable seizures . . . .”30  
Although the prosecutors’ challenged conduct could be viewed as in-
vestigative, the court concluded that once Monserrate had been ar-
rested, the questioning of Giraldo was clearly in preparation for and 
in furtherance of the court proceeding, and thus the prosecutors were 
entitled to absolute immunity for that conduct.31  “While questioning 
an important witness may accurately be described as investigative, 
appellants’ interview was an integral part of appellants’ advocatory 
function as prosecutors protected by absolute immunity.”32  This case 
serves as an extreme application of absolute immunity because the 
statements were made during an investigative stage, in which the po-
lice were still gathering evidence to support probable cause for an ar-
rest they had made.33 
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The result of Giraldo illustrates the 
recent trend by the Supreme Court to provide absolute immunity for 
prosecutors.  The Supreme Court has consistently drawn a distinction 
between investigative and prosecutorial acts in terms of when there is 
absolute immunity for prosecutors.  For example, in the cases of 
Burns v. Reed34 and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,35 the Court held that 
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for prosecutorial, but 




30 Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 164. 
31 Id. at 167.  The police said the arrest occurred before the intensive questioning of the 
woman, and it was the reason they arrested Monserrate.  Id.  But, the police were still essen-
tially in the investigative stage.  Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166-67. 
34 500 U.S. 478 (1991). 
35 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
36 Burns, 500 U.S. at 496; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278. 
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Van De Kamp v. Goldstein,37 a prosecutorial immunity case, the Su-
preme Court stated that even administrative decisions that affect sub-
sequent events in the courtroom should be protected by absolute 
prosecutorial immunity.38  Therefore, if certain acts relate to what is 
going to occur at trial, then absolute prosecutorial immunity is avail-
able for prosecutorial conduct that relates to courtroom events.39 
PROFESSOR BLUM: In sum, recent decisions from both the 
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit suggest that absolute immuni-
ty will be applied quite broadly to protect grand jury witnesses from 
civil rights claims based on their grand jury testimony, and to protect 
prosecutors who engage in administrative or investigative conduct 
that can be linked to their ultimate prosecutorial function in the court-
room.40 
II.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PRIVATE ACTORS SINCE 
FILARSKY 
Another recent development in the qualified immunity de-
fense to Section 1983 claims is the Court’s recent grant of qualified 
immunity to private actors working with the government.  In Wyatt v. 
Cole,41 the Supreme Court held that a private person, who had acted 
in conjunction with a sheriff in invoking a state replevin statute to al-
legedly deprive the plaintiff of property without due process, was not 
 
37 555 U.S. 335 (2009). 
38 Id. at 349. 
39 Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in 
the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 963 (2010) (“This decision 
[Van De Kamp] has implications for cases addressing the investigatory function because, in 
classifying administrative actions that relate to trial as protected prosecutorial functions, it 
implies that investigatory acts, which by definition relate to trial, are protected as well.”).  To 
resolve this, the Court must consider earlier cases that drew a bright line distinction between 
investigative and prosecutorial.  See, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S. at 494 (“Absolute immunity is 
designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with 
litigation . . . .  That concern therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for ac-
tions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every liti-
gation-inducing conduct.”); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (“A prosecutor may not shield his in-
vestigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is 
eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as prepa-
ration for a possible trial . . . .  When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the 
same, as they were here, the immunity that protects them is also the same.”). 
40 See generally Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly In-
competent” (and Maybe Some of Them, Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1049 
(2012) (discussing the Court’s trend in granting absolute and qualified immunity). 
41 504 U.S. 158 (1992). 
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entitled to the qualified immunity defense available to the govern-
ment official.42  Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Richardson v. 
McKnight,43 held that prison guards who were employed by a private 
prison management firm and assumed to be acting under color of 
state law, were not entitled to qualified immunity from prisoners’ 
Section 1983 claims.44  The Court found no “ ‘firmly rooted’ tradi-
tion”45 of qualified immunity for privately employed prison guards 
and no public policy concerns driving a qualified immunity defense 
where private employees performed with no government supervision, 
and private for-profit employers had market incentives to monitor 
and avoid improper conduct by employees.46  In the Court’s last 
Term, however, both Wyatt and Richardson were distinguished in 
Filarsky v. Delia,47 which raised the issue of whether a private attor-
ney retained by a city to conduct an internal affairs investigation was 
entitled to qualified immunity.48 
In Filarsky, a firefighter, Nicholas Delia, was suspected of 
feigning illness to receive disability benefits and to get time off from 
work to make improvements to his home.49  The city hired a private 
attorney, who specialized in employment and labor law, to assist in 
the investigation.50  The investigators and attorney went to Delia’s 
house and, without a warrant, requested to go inside to search for ev-
idence to prove he was not making improvements, but Delia re-
fused.51  Claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Delia 
sued the city, the fire department, and the private attorney.52  In re-
sponse, the private attorney claimed qualified immunity.53  The Court 
held that the private attorney who had worked with the government in 
such a capacity was entitled to the same immunity as a full-time em-
 
42 Id. at 168. 
43 521 U.S. 399 (1997).  The opinion was 5-4, with Justice Breyer writing for the majority, 
joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg.  See also Alexander A. Reinert, 
Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 483 (2011). 
44 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 402. 
45 Id. at 404. 
46 Id. at 409. 
47 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012). 




52 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661. 
53 Id. 
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ployee of the government.54  Therefore, in some cases, a private actor 
may be entitled to qualified immunity.55 
Although some circuits had granted qualified immunity for 
private citizens acting in the capacity of a public official prior to 
Richardson,56 very few have since Richardson.57  Thus, since 
Filarsky, it is unclear whether private actors acting under color of 
state law and vulnerable to suit under Section 1983 are entitled to 
qualified immunity.58 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: In my opinion, Richardson and 
Filarsky are inconsistent because in Richardson the Court empha-
sized that there was no direct government supervision over the prison 
guards,59 but that was true of the attorney in Filarsky as well.60  Addi-
tionally, there was profit-making incentive for the attorney in 
Filarsky, assuming he was hired for profit, just as there was profit in-
centive for the prison company in Richardson, which was critical to 
 
54 Id. at 1667-68. 
55 Id. at 1667. 
56 See, e.g., Eagon Through Eagon v. City of Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 1490 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding private citizen employed as event chairman was entitled to qualified immuni-
ty); Warner v. Grand Cnty., 57 F.3d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding private actor who 
performed strip search of female detainee at request of sheriff was entitled to qualified im-
munity); Williams v. O’Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding a private physi-
cian whose employer provided medical services to a prison was entitled to qualified immuni-
ty); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (“We hold, therefore, that 
individuals . . . under contract with the government, are entitled to raise a qualified immunity 
defense because they are the functional equivalent of public officials.”).  But see Burrell v. 
Bd. of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 796 (11th Cir. 1992) (qualified im-
munity not available for private actor who was “alleged to have acted in concert with public 
officials for the sole purpose of depriving another of her constitutional rights”). 
57 See, e.g., Toussie v. Powell, 323 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (denying qualified im-
munity for a private doctor who was working in a prison); see also Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 
510, 524 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding nurses working for private company that contracted to 
work in prison were not entitled to qualified immunity based on Richardson); Jensen v. Lane 
Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 576-80 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding no qualified immunity for privately 
organized group of psychiatrists under contract to provide psychiatry services to mental 
health detainees). 
58 See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9A.03 
(4th ed. Supp. 2012) (“Richardson v. McKnight seems like a harder case to distinguish from 
Filarsky because, like Filarsky, the private prison guards in Richardson were carrying out 
governmental responsibilities and presumably functioning akin to government employed 
prison guards.  Nevertheless, the Filarsky Court brushed Richardson aside as a ‘narrow’ de-
cision.”). 
59 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408-09 (“[I]t never has held that the mere performance of a 
governmental function could make the difference between unlimited § 1983 liability and 
qualified immunity, especially for a private person who performs a job without government 
supervision or direction.”). 
60 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667. 
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the Court’s rejection for the need of qualified immunity for the prison 
guards.61  Thus, it appears, Filarsky may signal to a new trend: pri-
vate actors working closely with the government may obtain quali-
fied immunity based on the nature of their relationship with state of-
ficials, even if the private actor had independent profit incentive.62 
PROFESSOR BLUM: A new trend is likely; but, on the other 
hand, Filarsky may only be an exception to the general rule.  Even 
after Richardson and before Filarsky, a number of circuits granted 
qualified immunity to private actors who were working closely with 
the government in unique, extreme circumstances, such as a one-on-
one or closely monitored situation.63  However, it remains unclear 
how the attorney in Filarsky is different from the private prison 
guards in Richardson, and Filarsky lacks any of the unique circum-
stances found in previous exception cases.  As a result, it will be im-
portant for practitioners in this area to track cases dealing with pri-
vate actors sued under Section 1983 to see where the circuits stand 
with regard to qualified immunity in this context post-Filarsky.  For 
example, in Currie v. Cundiff,64 one of the first post-Filarsky deci-
sions to address the question of Filarsky’s impact on qualified im-
munity for private actors in other contexts, the district court found 
that “the Supreme Court’s recent decision in [Filarsky] . . . makes 
clear that qualified immunity is a defense available in this case,”65 in-
volving private health care workers employed by a private corpora-
tion under contract with the county to provide health care to inmates 
at a county jail.66  It is truly difficult to distinguish private health care 
workers from private prison guards, but the court obviously thought 




63 See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause of the close-
ly monitored, non-profit interrelationship between FIA [Family Independence Agency] and 
LSS [Lutheran Social Services], we hold that the LSS defendants may assert qualified im-
munity.”); Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he psychiatrists, . . . 
are for purposes of this case state actors performing in concert with the department.  As such, 
they are . . . eligible for the balm of qualified immunity.”); see also Murphy v. N.Y. Racing 
Ass’n, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“NYRA is not really a market partici-
pant subject to competitive market pressures.  As such, unlike the prison firm’s employees 
[in Richardson], NYRA’s trustees need the encouragement and protection of qualified im-
munity.”). 
64 No. 09-CV-866-MJR, 2012 WL 2711469 (S.D. Ill. July 8, 2012). 
65 Id. at *4. 
66 Id. 
9
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default for private actors in such settings and Richardson was now 
the exception.  In contrast, in McCullum v. Tepe,67 the Sixth Circuit 
held there was no qualified immunity for a physician who was em-
ployed by an independent, nonprofit organization to work in a county 
prison as a psychiatrist.68  Therefore, even though Richardson in-
volved a for-profit corporation, and the court clearly stated that quali-
fied immunity for employees of for-profit corporations is unnecessary 
because such corporations are likely to be self-monitoring, the physi-
cian’s employer’s non-profit status was not important to the Sixth 
Circuit.69  McCullum is clearly inconsistent with Currie and other 
post-Filarsky cases dealing with doctors working in prisons.70  There 
will inevitably be a circuit split on this issue in the near future, and 
the Supreme Court will undoubtedly revisit the question.  Until then, 
practicing attorneys should keep a close watch on their own circuits 
to understand that circuit’s position on qualified immunity for private 
actors after Filarksy.71 
 
III.  THE NATURE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS POST-
PEARSON 
PROFESSOR BLUM: Another development worth following 
in the world of qualified immunity is the approach taken by courts in 
performing the qualified immunity analysis post-Pearson.  In Saucier 
v. Katz,72 the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to perform a 
 
67 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). 
68 Id. at 704. 
69 Id.; Richardson, 521 U.S. at 407. 
70 See, e.g., Ford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 12 C 4558, 2013 WL 474494, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2013) (noting that “[w]hether a privately employed medical official work-
ing at a prison may invoke qualified immunity is an open question in the Seventh Circuit,” 
but assuming the individual defendants could seek qualified immunity); Braswell v. Shore-
line Fire Dep’t, No. C08-924-RSM, 2012 WL 1857858, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2012) 
(“Here, as in Filarsky, Dr. Somers is an individual hired by the government to assist in carry-
ing out its work . . . .  Accordingly, Dr. Somers is entitled to assert qualified immunity.”). 
71 PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Yet another interesting point raised by Filarsky is that the 
Supreme Court rendered a qualified immunity decision without first determining whether 
there was state action.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1668.  The Court did the same thing in Rich-
ardson.  521 U.S. 399.  Determining state action should be the first inquiry because it is an 
essential element of a Section 1983 claim that the defendant acted under the color of state 
law; if there is no state action, there is no immunity issue.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  How-
ever, despite this, the Court jumped straight to the immunity inquiry with no explanation.  
See, e.g., Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1661-62; McCullum, 693 F.3d at 700. 
72 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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mandatory two-step analysis when deciding the issue of qualified 
immunity.73  The analysis required, first, a determination of whether 
the plaintiff had alleged a violation of a constitutional right under 
current law: in essence, the “merits” or constitutional question.74  On-
ly if the first inquiry were answered in the affirmative were courts to 
turn to the second inquiry, the qualified immunity prong, which re-
quires the plaintiff to show that the pertinent law was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the defendant’s conduct so that a reasonable offi-
cial would have understood that his or her conduct violated that 
clearly-established right.75 
After much resistance to and criticism of Saucier’s mandatory 
approach, the Supreme Court, in Pearson v. Callahan,76 provided 
lower courts with the freedom to avoid the merits question, allowing 
them instead to go directly to the second prong of the immunity in-
quiry.77  Pearson, decided in 2009, involved a confidential informant, 
not a police officer, who went to a drug dealer’s house and signaled 
the police to enter during a drug deal.78  The police did not have a 
warrant, but they contended that the consent given to the confidential 
informant to enter the house operated as consent for the police.79 
 
73 Id. at 200. 
74 See id. (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been vio-
lated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established, the question whether 
the right was clearly established must be considered on a more specific level . . . .”). 
75 Id. at 201-02 (emphasis added). 
76 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
77 See, e.g., Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Pearson freed courts 
from the mandatory nature of Saucier’s two-step process and allowed them to do the second, 
and often dispositive, step first.”); see also Costello v. City of Burlington, 632 F.3d 41, 51 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“Saucier’s two-step framework, while often helpful, is not mandatory . . . .”); 
Ammons v. Wash. Dept. of Soc. & Health Serv., 648 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[W]e first examine the clearly established law with respect to the alleged Fourteenth 
Amendment violation, and then determine whether the facts before us support such a viola-
tion.”); Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because the answer to the 
second of the two qualified immunity inquiries required by Pearson is plain, we . . . proceed 
directly to the question of whether the specific right upon which the claim hinges was clearly 
established . . . .”); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 570 F.3d 698, 720 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In 
light of Pearson, . . . we are free to consider those questions in whatever order is appropriate 
in light of the issues before us.”). 
78 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227. 
79 Id. at 229.  The doctrine of consent-once-removed is accepted in virtually all circuits for 
an undercover police officer who is allowed into a house and then signals other officers, but 
there was some question among the circuits about whether the consent-once-removed doc-
trine applied when it was not a police officer but a confidential informant who was given the 
consent.  John F. Decker & Kathryn A. Idzik, Disguising a New Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement: An Examination of the Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine and Its Hollow Justi-
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The Tenth Circuit held the police did not have consent to en-
ter, the entry was a violation of clearly established Fourth Amend-
ment law, and that the police were not entitled to qualified immuni-
ty.80  After asking the parties to brief the issue of whether Saucier’s 
two-step analysis should continue to be mandatory, the Supreme 
Court decided the first step was no longer mandatory, vacated the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision, and granted the police officers qualified 
immunity based exclusively on the second prong of the analysis.81  
After Pearson, lower courts are free to use their discretion.82  Hence, 
in appropriate cases, courts may go directly to the second prong.83 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Merits 
Inquiry 
Two recent post-Pearson cases reflect the tendency of the Su-
preme Court to favor bypassing the merits prong of the qualified im-
munity test, thus leaving unsettled constitutional issues raised in the 
context of qualified immunity.  First, in Messerschmidt v. Millen-
der,84 a warrant was issued to search a home for any weapons and in-
dicia of gang membership.85  Questions regarding the constitutionali-
ty of the search and warrant were raised.86  Although the incident that 
 
fications, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 156, 203 (2012) (noting that most jurisdictions have ex-
pressly adopted the doctrine of consent-once-removed and most other jurisdictions have de-
veloped a similar doctrine). 
80 Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, Pearson, 555 U.S. 
223. 
81 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 245.  While this author agrees with much of the criticism that had 
been directed towards Saucier’s mandatory “merits-first” approach to qualified immunity 
analysis, Pearson was a case where it would have made sense to address the merits question.  
The issue was not particularly fact driven, and it would have been helpful and instructive to 
law enforcement agencies and citizens to have a definitive answer to the question of whether 
consent given to a confidential informant operates as consent to officers entering the house 
without a warrant.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to answer that first question, 
instead going directly to the second question, and holding that there was qualified immunity.  
Id. 
82 Id. at 236 (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permit-
ted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular 
case at hand.”). 
83 Id. 
84 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012). 
85 Id. at 1241. 
86 Id.  PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Messerschmidt looked at the whole picture in evaluat-
ing whether the officer acted in a reasonable manner for the purpose of qualified immunity.  
Id. 
12
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provided the grounds for the search warrant resembled a domestic 
dispute—a young man shooting at his girlfriend after an argument es-
calated—the police viewed it as gang related.87  Additionally, even 
though a particular gun was used, the warrant authorized the police to 
search for any weapons and gang-related paraphernalia in the 
house.88 
The Supreme Court found the validity of the warrant under 
the Fourth Amendment was not an issue.89  Rather, the question was 
whether the police were entitled to immunity even if the warrant 
should not have been issued.90  Here, the Court focused on the fact 
that the officers acted appropriately in many respects;91 they sought 
and got approval for the warrant application from a superior and a 
deputy district attorney, and they went before a judge to get the war-
rant.92  Although the fact that a warrant was issued does not in itself 
 
87 Id. 
88 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1243.  DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The majority opinion is 
that it would be permissible to do the search for the purpose of gathering evidence for im-
peachment only.  Generally, the focus of searches by the police is gathering information to 
use in a prosecution, and this is the only instance in which the Supreme Court has stated that 
a search is permissible, but only to gather information for impeachment at trial.  See id. at 
1248 (stating that “evidence demonstrating Bowen’s membership in a gang might prove 
helpful in impeaching Bowen or rebutting various defenses he could raise at trial”); see also 
id. at 1256 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the Court has never treated searches different-
ly for impeachment purposes and to do so would allow the police to search almost anyone 
simply by saying it is for impeachment); Id. at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating support 
for validity of search for weapons, but “for all gang-related items . . . I would not award 
qualified immunity to Messerschmidt and his colleagues for this aspect of their search”). 
89 Id. at 1249 (“Whether any of these facts, standing alone or taken together, actually es-
tablish probable cause is a question we need not decide.”). 
90 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250. 
91 Id. at 1249-50 (noting officers sought approval from a superior and a warrant). 
92 Id. at 1249.  PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Additionally, officers are typically given the 
benefit of the doubt, because an officer may have acted unreasonably under the Fourth 
Amendment but nevertheless, may be found to have acted reasonably for the purpose of 
qualified immunity.  See, e.g., Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding defendant’s actions were unreasonable in terms of the Fourth Amendment, but were 
reasonable as to qualified immunity); see also Bendlin, supra note 40, at 1045 (“Currently, 
the objective government official merely has to act in a way that is not ‘entirely unreasona-
ble.’ ”).  PROFESSOR BLUM: The fact that an officer got approval from a superior or a 
warrant will count heavily towards granting qualified immunity but no one factor is determi-
native.  See Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 (“We also reject petitioner’s argument that . . . the act of 
applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable,”); see also Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1249 (focusing on police officer defendant’s actions in obtaining a warrant).  But see Groh 
v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 (2004) (“[A] warrant may be so facially deficient . . . that the 
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid” for the purposes of qualified 
immunity (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))).  DEAN CHEMERINSKY: Thus, whether the officer is afforded qualified 
13
Blum et al.: Qualified Immunity Developments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
646 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
provide qualified immunity, this case certainly suggests that a war-
rant is given great weight in supporting a claim of qualified immuni-
ty, regardless of whether the Court determined the plaintiff had a 
constitutional right violated.93  While avoiding the merits question of 
whether, on the particular facts of the case, there was probable cause 
to support the scope of the warrant issued, the Court made it clear 
that reasonable conduct by the police will go a long way towards 
supporting a finding of qualified immunity.94 
In Reichle v. Howards,95 once again, the Court went directly 
to the second prong.  Mr. Howards was arrested after he approached 
then-Vice President Cheney at a shopping mall in Colorado where 
Cheney was making a public appearance.96  Howards criticized 
Cheney’s policies, touched the Vice President on the shoulder, 
walked away and was then questioned by secret service agents.97  
When he falsely denied having touched the Vice President, Howards 
was arrested.98  He sued the responsible secret service officers for vi-
olating his Fourth and First Amendment rights, claiming that his ar-
rest was in retaliation for his critical comments about the Vice Presi-
dent.99  Ultimately, Howards did not challenge the determination that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation because probable cause 
existed to arrest him “for making a materially false statement to a 
federal official.”100  The federal agents, however, sought review of 
the denial of qualified immunity with respect to Howards’ First 
Amendment claim.101  The Tenth Circuit held that Howards had es-
 
immunity turns on reasonableness: if the conduct is clearly unreasonable, even if a superior 
approved it, qualified immunity will not be given.  Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. 
93 Justices Kagan, Sotomayor and Ginsburg all dissented. 
94 See also Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990, 992 (2012) (per curiam) (Without decid-
ing the merits question, concluding that “reasonable police officers in petitioners’ position 
could have come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the 
Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that violence was im-
minent.”). 
95 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012). 
96 Id. at 2091. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 2092. 
99 Id. 
100 Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2092. 
101 Id.  Because federal agents were sued, the case was brought as a Bivens action, not a 
Section 1983 action.  While the Court “has recognized an implied cause of action for damag-
es against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations,” the Court in Reichle assumed 
without deciding that a First Amendment violation could give rise to a claim under Bivens.  
Id. at 2093 n.4. 
14
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tablished a material factual dispute as to whether his arrest was moti-
vated by an impermissible purpose and, if so, the law was clearly es-
tablished in the Tenth Circuit that a retaliatory arrest was unlawful 
even if supported by probable cause.102  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari “on two questions: whether a First Amendment retaliatory 
arrest claim may lie despite the presence of probable cause to support 
the arrest, and whether clearly established law at the time of How-
ards’ arrest so held.”103  Leaving the merits question undecided,104 the 
Court held the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because 
the law was not clearly established regarding First Amendment retal-
iatory arrest claims in cases where there was probable cause for the 
arrest.105  Given the current circuit split on the merits question,106 the 
Supreme Court will no doubt be urged to revisit the question of retal-
iatory arrests to clarify whether the existence of probable cause de-
feats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.107 
B.  The Lower Courts’ Avoidance of the Merits 
Inquiry 
The extent of Pearson’s negative effect on the development 
and clarification of constitutional rights is also apparent in lower 
court decisions, which demonstrate the courts’ willingness to ignore 
the merits question, leaving the constitutional issue for another day.  
 
102 Id. at 2092. 
103 Id. at 2093. 
104 Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (electing to address only the second question). 
105 Id. 
106 See Randolph A. Robinson II, Policing the Police: Protecting Civil Remedies in Cases 
of Retaliatory Arrest, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 500 (2012) (stating in Reichle “the Court 
punted on the more important legal issue, thereby insuring a continued circuit split . . . as to 
the role that probable cause should play in civil suits for retaliatory arrests”). 
107 For post-Reichle decisions, see, e.g., Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (recognizing a First Amendment retaliatory “booking and jailing” claim even 
where probable cause existed); Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 253 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding officer had qualified immunity “because neither our circuit nor the Supreme Court 
has ‘recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported 
by probable cause’ ”); Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The court be-
low found Storey’s arrest was lawful.  It also found that when an arrest is lawful, ‘then there 
is no but-for causation for a related tort requiring a retaliatory motive.’  Thus, the court ap-
plied qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. This result was consistent with 
[Reichle].”); Veth Mam v. City of Fullerton, No. 8:11-cv-1242–JST (MLGx), 2013 WL 
951401, at *6  (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (noting that “the Ford decision makes it apparent 
that Reichle has not cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedents holding that retaliatory 
arrests supported by probable cause are actionable under § 1983”). 
15
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For example, in Doninger v. Niehoff,108 the Second Circuit refused to 
express an opinion as to whether there was a violation of a student’s 
First Amendment free speech right when she was prohibited from 
running for senior class secretary in response to a post on the Internet 
regarding the possible cancellation of a student event and the superin-
tendent’s involvement in the upset of plans.109  The court saw “no 
need to decide”110 the question of whether the school officials violat-
ed plaintiff’s constitutional rights, because the First Amendment right 
was not clearly established at the time.111 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Embody v. Ward112 left unde-
cided the question of whether the Second Amendment provides a 
right to bear arms within state parks.113  Where such a right was not 
clearly established at the time of the arrest, the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity.114  And, in Hagans v. Franklin County Sher-
riff,115 involving a repeated tasing of an individual after he resisted 
arrest,116 the court avoided the merits question: whether there was a 
Fourth Amendment violation.117  The court held that the law govern-
ing taser use on a suspect who was resisting arrest was not clearly es-
tablished, and as a result, the officer was entitled to qualified im-
munity.118  Qualified immunity often arises in cases involving the use 
of a taser, which is a relatively new technology with very little gov-
erning law, and consequently, some courts have jumped to the second 
prong without resolving whether the use of the taser in the particular 
situation was unlawful.119  Like the Supreme Court, lower courts too 
 
108 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
109 Id. at 346. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 695 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012). 
113 See id. at 581-82 (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right 
to bear arms within state parks . . . .  Such a right may or may not exist, but the critical point 
for our purposes is that it has not been established—clearly or otherwise at this point.  That 
suffices to resolve this claim under the Court’s qualified-immunity precedents.”). 
114 Id. 
115 695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012).  The court only determined that the police did not violate 
a well settled law, declining to determine whether an individual has a Fourth Amendment 
right against the police’s use of a taser.  See id. at 508 (“We opt to answer the easier of the 
two questions, saving the harder one for another day.”). 
116 Id. at 507. 
117 Id. at 508. 
118 Id. at 511. 
119 See, e.g., German v. Sosa, 399 F. App’x 554, 557 (11th Cir. 2010) (“No case, statute, 
or principle within the Constitution provides the necessary precedent to clearly establish the 
16
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have left constitutional issues unanswered as a result of Pearson. 
C.  Answering the Merits Question Since Pearson 
Not all courts have avoided the merits inquiry.  In Mattos v. 
Agarano,120 for example, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, confront-
ed the question of whether the use of a taser violated the Fourth 
Amendment in the contexts presented in the two cases consolidated 
for en banc review.  One case involved a seven-month pregnant 
woman who was tased three times in drive stun mode for refusing to 
sign the back of a speeding ticket.121  The plaintiff in the companion 
case, a victim of domestic violence,122 was tased, apparently in dart 
mode,123 when she tried to defuse the situation by stepping between 
her husband and the police.124  The court held that both tasings con-
 
rights [plaintiff] claims were violated by the [defendant’s] use of a taser.  Thus, qualified 
immunity applies . . . .”); Russell v. Wright, No. 3:11-cv-00075, 2013 WL 74439, at *11 
 (W.D. Va. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Given the dearth of caselaw on the use of tasers in excessive 
force cases, particularly within the Fourth Circuit, the court simply cannot say that Wright’s 
use of his taser under these circumstances violated clearly established law. Tasers are still 
relatively novel devices, and courts across the country continue to grapple with determining 
their proper role in assisting law enforcement officers.”).  But see Meyers v. Baltimore 
Cnty,, No. 11-2192, 2013 WL 388125, at *8 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[T]he absence of a ju-
dicial decision holding that it is unlawful to use a taser repeatedly and unnecessarily under 
similar circumstances does not prevent a court from denying a qualified immunity de-
fense.”); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 732 (“[W]e conclude that it was clearly 
established on June 25, 2007, that it is unlawful to deploy a taser in dart mode against a non-
violent misdemeanant who had just been tased in dart mode and made no movement when, 
after the first tasing, the officer instructed her to turn over.”);  Austin v. Redford Twp. Police 
Dept., 690 F.3d 490, 499 (6th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘Even without precise knowledge that the use of 
the [t]aser would be a violation of a constitutional right,’ on these facts, Morgan ‘should 
have known based on analogous cases that [his] actions were unreasonable.’ ”) (citation 
omitted); Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[G]eneral constitu-
tional principles against excessive force that were clearly established at the time of the inci-
dent between Deputy Eichenberger and Shekleton were such as to put a reasonable officer on 
notice that tasering Shekleton under the circumstances as presented by Shekleton was exces-
sive force in violation of the clearly established law.”); see generally Aaron Sussman, Shock-
ing the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon Technology Reveal About Excessive 
Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342, 1344 (2012). 
120 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
121 Id. at 436-37. 
122 Id. at 438. 
123 For a description of the difference between dart mode and drive stun mode, see, e.g., 
Abbott, 705 F.3d at 725.  A major difference is that the use of the taser in dart mode will sub-
ject the victim to temporary paralysis of the muscles, overriding the victim’s central nervous 
system.  The use of the taser in drive stun mode inflicts temporary pain in order to achieve 
compliance with the officer’s commands, but does not result in paralysis of the muscles.  Id. 
124 Mattos, 661 F.3d at 439. 
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stituted a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, but the of-
ficers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time 
of both incidents was unclear as to what level of force was involved 
with taser use, on what constituted a significant level of force, or un-
der what circumstances a taser could be used.125 
When a court of appeals addresses the merits question and de-
clares a constitutional right has been violated, but the defendant pre-
vails on the qualified immunity prong of the analysis, an interesting 
problem is presented.  May the defendant, the prevailing party in the 
court below, seek review in the Supreme Court of the merits question 
that was decided in the plaintiff’s favor?  While the defendant offi-
cials whose conduct has been deemed unconstitutional are shielded 
from liability in the case decided, future conduct under similar cir-
cumstances will be governed by the newly declared constitutional 
standard and qualified immunity will not be afforded.  For example, 
in Mattos, police officials may not have agreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision that the taser use was unconstitutional, even though 
the officers were relieved of liability by a finding of qualified im-
munity.126 
The Supreme Court provided instruction on this issue in 
Camreta v. Greene.127  In Camreta, a police officer and a social 
worker removed a child from her classroom to investigate suspected 
abuse at home.128  The issue was whether this “seizure” and question-
ing required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment or whether an 
exception applied due to the school setting.129  The Ninth Circuit held 
that regular Fourth Amendment doctrine applied, thereby requiring a 
warrant to remove a child from the classroom and interrogate her.130  
Nevertheless, the social worker and police officer were given quali-
fied immunity because the law was not clearly established.131  Subse-
quently, the defendants, despite prevailing, sought review in the Su-
 
125 Id at 452. 
126 See generally id. (deciding first prong in favor of plaintiff, but granting qualified im-
munity based on second prong). 
127 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).  The Court addressed the question of whether “government 
officials who prevail on grounds of qualified immunity [may] obtain our review of a court of 
appeals’ decision that their conduct violated the Constitution . . . .”  Id. at 2026; see also id. 
at 2030 (“As a matter of practice and prudence, we have generally declined to consider cases 
at the request of a prevailing party . . . .”). 
128 Id. at 2027. 
129 Id. at 2026. 
130 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027. 
131 Id. 
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/9
2013]     QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS 651 
preme Court as to the holding that a warrant is required under such 
circumstances.132 
The Supreme Court held that on rare occasions it will grant 
certiorari to review the merits question, even though the appealing 
parties prevailed below.133  However, the Court emphasized that the 
holding only applied to its own authority to hear such appeals, not the 
circuit courts.134  Circuit courts need not review district court opin-
ions at the behest of defendants who have prevailed on qualified im-
munity, even if such opinions err on the merits question, because dis-
trict court opinions do not carry the same precedential authority as 
opinions from the courts of appeals, and thus cannot serve to clearly 
establish the law.135  Therefore, although courts may be avoiding the 
merits inquiry with ever-greater frequency, attorneys should be aware 
of the precedent that may be created by a circuit court’s adverse rul-
ing on the merits question, even if qualified immunity is ultimately 
granted.  In Camreta, the Court signaled a willingness to review such 
constitutional determinations. 
IV.  THE STANDARD FOR ASCERTAINING “CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHED LAW” 
Because qualified immunity is entwined with the question of 
whether there was “clearly established law” at the time of the chal-
lenged action to put a reasonable official on notice that his or her 
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it is obviously 
important to figure out what makes the law “clearly established.”  
First, there is the question of what law controls.  In Wilson v. 
Layne,136 news reporters on a police ride-along were invited to enter a 
citizen’s home during a police search, which was authorized by a 
warrant.137  In this pre-Pearson case, the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the merits inquiry: whether it was unconstitutional for the po-
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 2032.  In this particular case, the issue turned out to be moot because by the time 
it reached the Supreme Court the child was no longer a child, but had already grown and 
moved out of the state and clearly would not be subjected to such conduct again.  In light of 
its finding of mootness, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the merits.  Id. at 
2035-36. 
134 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 (“We emphasize, however, two limits of today’s holding.  
First, it addresses only our own authority to review cases in this procedural posture.”). 
135 Wheeler v. City of Lansing, 660 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011). 
136 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
137 Id. at 607. 
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lice to bring the news reporters into the home of a private citizen.138  
The Court unanimously held that bringing reporters into a private 
home, even when the police entry was authorized by a warrant, vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment “when the presence of the third parties 
in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”139  With 
only Justice Stevens dissenting,140 the Court went on to conclude that, 
despite the finding of a constitutional violation by a unanimous 
Court, the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident 
such that a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment.141  The Court framed the issue as the 
objective question of “whether a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved that bringing members of the media into a home during the ex-
ecution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established 
law and the information the officers possessed.”142  The Court con-
cluded that general Fourth Amendment principles did not apply with 
obvious clarity to the officers’ conduct in this case.143  Furthermore, 
“[p]etitioners [had] not brought to [the Court’s] attention any cases of 
controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident 
which clearly established the rule on which they [sought] to rely, nor 
[had] they identified a consensus of cases of persuasive authority 
such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions 
were lawful.”144  Thus, absent any pertinent Supreme Court or con-
trolling circuit court decision or a consensus of persuasive authority 
from other circuits, the Court concluded that the law was not clearly 
established such that reasonable officers would have understood that, 
under these circumstances, entering the house with the reporters vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.145  While most circuits will consider a 
consensus of persuasive authority from other circuits in the absence 
of controlling precedent,146 both the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
 
138 Id. at 609, 611. 
139 Id. at 614. 
140 Id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
141 Wilson, 525 U.S. at 615. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 615-16. 
144 Id. at 617. 
145 Id. at 617-18. 
146 See, e.g., McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(stating it is appropriate for courts to look to other circuits when neither the Fifth Circuit nor 
the Supreme Court has spoken); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth & Their Families, 274 
F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (instructing courts to “look not only to Supreme Court precedent 
but to all available case law” in determining the contours of a right); Medina v. City of Den-
20
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have expressed disapproval of such an approach.147 
Once the relevant source of “clearly established law” has been 
determined, the more difficult task is figuring out what is required to 
make the law “clearly established.”  It is on this issue that most of the 
debate takes place, and what has become clear is that the framing of 
the question may be determinative of the answer. 
One problem with negotiating the clearly-established-law ter-
rain is that the Supreme Court, in earlier cases, sent mixed signals as 
to what is sufficient to give officials notice that certain conduct is un-
constitutional.  In Saucier v. Katz, Hope v. Pelzer,148 and Brosseau v. 
Haugen,149 the Supreme Court addressed the problem of defining the 
contours of the right in the Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amend-
ment contexts.  In Saucier, the Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to 
construe the clearly established law standard more narrowly and to 
frame the contours of the right that must be found clearly with more 
attention to the particular facts of the case before the court.150  Asking 
whether it was clearly established that unreasonable use of force vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment is framing the question too broadly.151  
In Hope, the plaintiff alleged that he was handcuffed to a hitching 
post for seven hours in the hot sun, without bathroom breaks and with 
no or very little water.152  The Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged 
conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, but affirmed the district 
 
ver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[T]here must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Cir-
cuit decision on point, or [there must be] clearly established weight of authority from other 
courts . . . .”).   See also Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (“In the 
absence of binding precedent, a court should look to all available decisional law, including 
decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district courts.” (quoting Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993))). 
147 See Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying law was clearly estab-
lished, without looking to other circuits, “because neither this court nor the Supreme Court 
had recognized such a right at that time”); see also Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 
F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[O]nly Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and 
Georgia Supreme Court caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law in this circuit.”); Marsh v. Butler 
Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When case law is needed to ‘clearly es-
tablish’ the law applicable to the pertinent circumstances, we look to decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest 
court of the pertinent state.”). 
148 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
149 543 U.S. 194 (2004). 
150 See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200 (“[T]he question whether the right was clearly established 
must be considered on a more specific level than recognized by the [Ninth Circuit] Court of 
Appeals.”). 
151 Id. at 201-02. 
152 Hope, 526 U.S. at 734-35. 
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court’s grant of qualified immunity on the clearly-established-law 
prong of the analysis.153  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that the plaintiff had 
asserted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.154  The Court re-
versed, however, as to the grant of qualified immunity, admonishing 
the court of appeals for its overly rigid approach to the qualified im-
munity analysis.155  The Court instructed the Eleventh Circuit to con-
strue the clearly-established-law standard more liberally, rejecting the 
requirement of a case on point,156 instead stating that all that was re-
quired was “fair warning” that the challenged conduct was unconsti-
tutional.157 
The Court’s language in Hope is clearly more “plaintiff-
friendly,” but since that decision, the “fair warning” formula has been 
virtually ignored by the Supreme Court.158  For example, in Brosseau, 
the Court addressed just the second prong of the analysis and sum-
marily reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the defendant of-
ficer because the plaintiff could point to no case that “squarely gov-
erned” the situation confronting Officer Brosseau in that case, 
“whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through 
vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are a risk from 
that flight.”159  More significantly, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,160 the Su-
preme Court recently raised the bar for plaintiffs to overcome the 
clearly-established-law hurdle.  The majority opinion, written by Jus-
tice Scalia, added the “every reasonable” phrase to the clearly estab-
lished law test, surreptitiously changing the game when nobody was 
looking.161 
Thus, defendants seeking qualified immunity will now proffer 
the Al-Kidd formulation of the test and argue that “ ‘a government of-
ficial’s conduct violates clearly established law when at the time of 
 
153 Id. at 735-36. 
154 Id. at 737. 
155 Id. at 739. 
156 Id. at 739, 741. 
157 Hope, 526 U.S. at 741. 
158 See generally Daniel K. Siegel, Clearly Established Enough: The Fourth Circuit’s 
New Approach to Qualified Immunity in Bellotte v. Edwards, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1252 
(2012) (discussing the modern trend among the circuits to require a case on point for law to 
be clearly established). 
159 Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200-01. 
160 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
161 Id. at 2083. 
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the challenged conduct the contours of the right are sufficiently clear’ 
that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that was he is 
doing violates that right.’ ”162  The language “a reasonable official” 
was replaced and is now “every reasonable official,”163 a major 
change in the stringency of the clearly-established-law test.164  The 
Court further explained that the “existing precedent must have placed 
the statute or constitutional question beyond debate.”165  Lower courts 
have taken note of the Supreme Court’s conflicting messages and the 
current Court’s raising of the qualified immunity bar.  In a post-Al-
Kidd en banc decision, Morgan v. Swanson,166 the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to elementary school 
principals who restricted the distribution of written religious materi-
als in public elementary schools.167  Writing for the majority of the en 
banc panel, Judge Benevides made the following observations: 
The Al-Kidd Court, in admonishing lower 
courts “not to define clearly established law at a high 
level of generality,” did not discuss or even cite Hope, 
nor other earlier opinions reflecting a similar concern 
that a damages remedy be available for “obvious” or 
flagrant constitutional violations.  This silence is puz-
zling given that Al-Kidd reversed a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion denying immunity in reliance on Hope.  Adding 
 
162 Id. (emphasis added). 
163 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“[O]ur cases establish that the 
right the official is alleged to violate must have been “clearly established” in a more particu-
larized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”); see 
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government 
officials . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”) (emphasis added). 
164 Although it is surprising that no Justice opposed this addition, it is not clear whether 
they were unaware of the addition or they actually agreed with it.  See generally Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074.  While sitting in the Second Circuit, Justice Sotomayor wrote a 
concurrence touching on this distinction.  Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Whether reasonably competent officers could disagree about 
the lawfulness of the conduct at issue, however, is not the same question the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly instructed us to consider: whether ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer 
that his [or her] conduct was unlawful in the situation he [or she] confronted.’ ”) (citing 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202) (emphasis in original). 
165 Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
166 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
167 Id. at 382. 
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to the perplexity is that, in its next major “clearly es-
tablished” opinion after Hope, the Supreme Court 
granted qualified immunity because there were no 
cases that “squarely govern[ed].”  That said, this case 
does not call on us to decide whether the Court’s 
statements in Hope survive Al-Kidd: the constitutional 
issue in this case is far from “beyond debate,” as evi-
denced by a large body of oft-conflicting case law and 
the variety of opinion among members of this Court.  
We leave for another day the question of whether and 
when a constitutional violation may be so “obvious” 
that its illegality is clear from only a generalized 
statement of law.168 
DEAN CHEMERINSKY: The heightened standard is facially 
apparent in the test’s phrasing.  The Harlow standard for thirty years 
focused on whether it was clearly established law that “a” reasonable 
officer should know; now it must be law that “every” reasonable of-
ficer should know.169  Now, after Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, it must be a 
right that is beyond dispute.170  Why did no Justice challenge this?  
Perhaps it was that Justice Scalia did not call attention to the shift and 
the other Justices simply did not notice the change in the law.171 
Therefore, courts are able to grant qualified immunity and 
dismiss Section 1983 claims by requiring an exact case on point from 
a high level court and the recently implemented heightened standard 
for proving a clearly established law. 
 
168 Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).  See also Mattos, 661 F.3d at 448  (“We cannot con-
clude . . . that ‘every ‘reasonable official would have understood’ . . .  beyond debate’ that 
tasing Brooks in these circumstances constituted excessive force.”); De Contreras v. City of 
Rialto, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1252 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The Supreme Court recently empha-
sized the high burden that must be met for a plaintiff to overcome qualified immunity, re-
placing Anderson’s language of ‘a reasonable official’ with ‘every reasonable official’ and 
stating that ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question be-
yond debate.’ ”).  But see Morgan, 659 F.3d at 393 (Dennis, J., specially concurring in parts 
and not joining in other parts) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Camreta v. 
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), do not 
overrule Hope, Lanier, or any case in that line.”). 
169 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (requiring a reasonable person); see also Al-Kidd, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2083 (requiring every reasonable official). 
170 Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. 
171 See generally id. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
PROFESSOR BLUM: Looking through any lens, it is diffi-
cult to avoid the conclusion that the Roberts Court is strongly pro-
immunity.  The scope of absolute immunity has been expanded to in-
clude prosecutors engaged in administrative functions172 and witness-
es before grand juries.173  With respect to qualified immunity, it ap-
pears the Court is ready to afford the protection to various categories 
of private actors working with government officials, and Richardson 
will be confined to its facts.174  The standard for determining when 
the law is clearly established has been ratcheted up.  Hope, while not 
overruled, is largely ignored or distinguished by both the Supreme 
Court and lower courts.  Beyond the issue of how one determines 
whether the law is clearly established, many other questions regard-
ing the qualified immunity defense to Section 1983 claims remain 
unanswered.175  For litigators in this area, it is imperative to keep up 
with the many twists and turns that may result from Supreme Court 
cases that often confuse more than clarify the issues.  One thing is 
certainly clearly established.  Whether you represent plaintiffs or de-
 
172 Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344. 
173 Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1506. 
174 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667. 
175 PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: One of the biggest issues that is unresolved is, does qual-
ified immunity protect reasonable mistakes of fact.  See generally Karen Blum, Qualified 
Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of § 1983 as It Applies to 
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 577-78, 591-92 (2005).  
There is Supreme Court authority that it protects only reasonable mistakes of law; however, 
Justice Kennedy wrote in dissent that it also protects reasonable mistakes of fact.  See, e.g., 
Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While the constitutional 
violation prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of fact, the clearly estab-
lished prong concerns the reasonableness of the officer’s mistake of law.”).  But see Groh, 
540 U.S. at 567 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Our qualified immunity doctrine applies regard-
less of whether the officer’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based 
on mixed questions of law and fact.”).  See also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009). 
PROFESSOR BLUM:  Additionally, issues of the role of the judge and the jury as fact find-
ers also arise when there is a dispute regarding qualified immunity and there are material 
facts that have to be decided by the jury.  If the case goes to the jury, there should be special 
interrogatories given to the jury on the questions of fact.  Although the judge ultimately de-
cides the question of law, that decision will be based on the jury’s findings of fact; thus, fac-
tual, detailed and specific questions are essential—general interrogatories are not helpful.  
See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that a particular 
finding of fact is essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is entitled to 
qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the defendant to request that the jury be asked 
the pertinent question.”). 
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fendants in these cases, you have a tough job, and staying on top of 
the law, as murky as it may be, is essential. 
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